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CASENOTES 153 
TRIAL PRACTICE-MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL-WHAT 
MAY A SUCCEEDING JUDGE CONSJl)ER IN RULING ON 
MOTION MADE BEFORE HIS PREDECESSOR 
In an action against the manufacturer for damages caused by 
a defect in an automobile, the jury returned a verdict for the 
plaintiff in the amount of $50,000, whereupon the trial judge 
stated, "Members of the jury, I am astounded. It is my opinion 
that that is clearly against the weight of the evidence in this 
case." A motion for a new trial was made by the defendant, but 
the trial judge died before it could be heard by him. Subsequently, 
the motion was assigned to another judge of the district court 
who denied the motion on the ground that he was not free to i·e-
weigh the evidence and on condition that the plaintiff remit so 
much of the verdict as was in excess of $31,060. Held: Re-
manded to the district court with instructions to reconsider the 
motion for a new trial by weighing the evidence and all other 
relevant factors. The court stated that one relevant factor was 
the expressed views of the trial judge at the time the verdict was 
rendered.1 
1 Magee v. General Motors, 213 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1954). 
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Despite the provision made in Rule 63 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure,2 which grants power to a succeeding judge to 
i·ule on motions left undecided by his predecessor, there remains 
the question of what can be considered by the successor in his 
determination of the motions. 
Under the common law practice, leaving a motion for a new 
trial undecided was a proper grounds for a new trial where the 
trial judge was incapacitated, or for other reasons did not com-
plete the trial. The reasoning behind such a practice was that 
there was no record of the trial proceedings on which the successor 
could base a decision.3 With the enactment of statutes providing 
for stenographic reports of the trial proceedings and as improve-
ments in the methods of taking the record of trials were developed, 
it became the practice to allow the succeeding judge power to 
decide motions left undecided by the previous judge.4 
The most serious objection raised in allowing the successor 
to rule on motions for new trials has been that he was not physi-
cally present at the trial, and therefore could not give proper 
weight to the appearance of 'vitnesses and their manner of testi-
fying-both of which would have an effect on the weight given 
to their testimony.5 This argument has been especially urged 
when the grounds for the new trial were that the verdict of the 
jury was against the weight of evidence.6 However, even in this 
situation it is held that the successor can make a fair and just 
ruling as to the desirability for a new trial by an examination of 
the record of evidence.7 
2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 63. 
3 Penn l\1ut. Life Ins. Co.v. Ashe, 145 Fed. 593 (6th Cir. 1906); Bass 
, .. Swingley, 42 Kan. 729, 22 Pac. 714 (1889). 
4 Brent v. Chas. H. Lilly Co., 202 Fed. 335 (W.D. Wash. 1913); Mel-
drum v. United States, 151 Fed. 177 (9th Cir. 1907); Commonwealth v. 
Gedzium, 261 Mass. 299, 159 N.E. 51 (1927); Great Northern Ry. v. 
Becher-Barrett-Lockerby Co., 200 Minn. 258, 274 N.W. 522 (1937); South-
hall v. Evans, 114 Va. 461, 76 S.E. 929 (1913). 
o People ex rel Hambel v. McConnell, 155 Ill. 192, 40 N.E. 608 (1895). 
tJ Bass v. Swingley, 42 Kan. 729, 22 Pac. 714 (1889); Heiland v. Hilde-
brand, 81 Ohio .App. 25, 70 N.E.2d 678 (1946); Lance v. Slusher, 74 Ohio 
.App. 361, 59 N.E.2d 57 (1944); Bernard v. McRay, 89 Okla. 1, 213 Pac. 
82 (1923); Carkonen v. Columbia & P.S. Ry., 102 Wash. 11, 172 Pac. 
816 (1918). 
7 Heiland v. Hildebrand, 81 Ohio .App. 25, 70 N.E.2d 678 (1946); 
Lance v. Slusher, 74 Ohio App. 361, 59 N.E.2d 57 (1944); Bernard v. 
l\1cRay, 89 Okla. 1, 213 Pac. 82 (1923); Carkonen v. Columbia & P.S. 
Ry., 102 Wash. 11, 172 Pac. 816 (1918). 
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Statutes giving the succeeding judge power to decide motions 
made in the trial before his predecessor have been silent on what 
the succeeding judge should consider in making his decision. Dicta 
in the cases usually indicates that the succeeding judge should 
consider the evidence of the trial as found in the transcript of 
the proceedings.8 There has been little occasion for a court to 
decide whether the former trial judge's statements of opinion may 
be taken into consideration.9 
When a court requires the succeeding judge to consider state-
ments of opinion, it is departing from the very basis on which the 
successor's power was allowed, i.e., that the evidence on which 
the jury verdict was based can be found in the record of trial, 
thus enabling the succeeding judge to make a fair ruling as to a 
motion for a new trial. Such a practice can lead to unjust re-
sults and cause hardship to the participants in the litigation. For 
example, suppose that upon the rendition of the verdict by the 
jury, the trial judge exclaims, without thought on his part, that 
in his opinion the verdict is against the weight of evidence. It 
may be that the evidence actually supports the verdict, and upon 
further contemplation the trial judge would have realized that 
his prior statement was erroneous. He dies before he can rule 
on the motion for a new trial. The successor, relying on this 
opinion rather than the evidence in the record, might grant a new 
trial. This would cause the appellee to relitigate his claim for no 
valid reason. 
Conversely, the trial judge, in the previous example, might 
exclaim that the jury's decision was correct when in fact the rec-
ord shows this conclusion to be erroneous. The successor, giving 
undue weight to that statement of opinion, refuses the motion for 
new trial. As a result such a conclusion deprives a deserving 
person a new trial. 
Further, in the instant case it is within the realm of possi-
bility that the previous judge's remark, "It is my opinion that 
that is clearly against the weight of evidence," was concerned 
s Lance v. Slusher, 74 Ohio App. 361, 59 N.E.2d 57 (1944); Great 
Northern Ry. v. Becher-Barrett-Lockerby Co., 200 l\Iinn. 258, 27 4 N.W. 
522 (1937); Bernard v. l\icRay, 89 Okla. l, 213 Pac. 82 (1923); People v. 
McConnell, 155 Ill. 192, 40 N.E. 608 (1895). 
9 Carkonen v. Columbia & P.S. Ry., 102 Wash. 11, 172 Pac. 816 ( 1918) 
("This, we think, shows that the judge while taking into consideration 
what he conceived to be the views of his predecessor in office, determined 
the matter from the entire record, and exercised his own judgment and 
discretion in so doing."). 
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only with the question of excessive damages as shown by the 
evidence, not with the jury's finding of defendant's liability. It 
would be mere guesswork to say to what part of the jury's ver-
dict he intended to refer. In the case in question, the damages 
were actually reduced by the successor. This strengthens the 
proposition that the basis of the predecessor's opinion was that 
the damages were excessive as shown by the evidence. 
In Nebraska10 another problem is presented as to what a 
successor may consider in ruling on a motion for a new trial. A 
ruling on a motion for a new trial is appealable to the supreme 
court. Contrary to federal practice, the Nebraska Supreme Court 
decides the motion on its merits without remanding it to the trial 
court for reconsideration. As in federal practice, the supreme 
court should restrict itself to a consideration of the evidence in 
the record and ignore the trial court's statement of opinion. 
In conclusion, the succeeding judge should restrict his con-
sideration to evidence in the record when ruling on a motion for 
a new trial. He should disregard a predecessor's statements of 
opinions for the following reasons: (1) The statements are not 
evidence received in the trial court; (2) There is a possibility of 
misinterpreting the reason for his remarks; (3) There is the un-
certainty of whether the judge would have changed his mind 
after reflecting on the evidence. 
William H. Hein, '55 
10 Krepcik v. Interstate Transit Lines, 153 Neb. 98, 43 N.W.2d 609 
(1950). 
